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Abstract 
 
 
It is well acknowledged, both in academia and media, that the United States 
is highly pessimistic of China’s increased presence in international affairs. 
Often, this Sino-pessimism is expressed through US political discourse on 
Sino-African relations. However, upon closer examination, the US, starting 
in the second Bush-era, began from a point of reserved optimism in regard to 
Sino-African relations. This reveals that the notion that the US has remained 
static in its negative portrayal of Sino-African relations is inaccurate. This 
study will examine how the US political discourse surrounding Sino-African 
relations has evolved through the Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations, 
and more importantly why this evolution has occurred. Using critical 
discourse analysis, this study examines US elite political discourse to reveal 
themes and unquestioned assumptions prevalent in the US portrayal of Sino-
African relations. This study finds that the discourse used by each of these 
administrations reveals more about the US than it does about the Sino-African 
relationship. The Bush administration showed excessive optimism that 
manifested through coercive liberalism and believed that the Chinese would 
model their engagement with Africa on US engagement and become an ally 
in liberalising Africa. The Obama administration attempted to rehabilitate the 
international image of the US through grand rhetoric and international 
liberalism, while positioning China as the illiberal ‘other’ that was a threat to 
African freedom and dignity. The Trump administration represents a shift to 
realism, spouting Sinophobia in Africa while spouting anti-Africa rhetoric in 
the United States, with a stated aim of upsetting the liberal order to unclear 
ends. By tracking change over time, the US discourse reveals more about how 
the US was attempting to project its self-image at the time than it does about 
Sino-African relations. 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
“America’s responsibility in the 21st century is to remain the shining city upon the hill,  
the force of whose ideas inspire greater chapters in man’s development.” 
 
- Nana Akufo-Addo 
 
 
To study the three most recent US presidents is to witness a ‘hyperpower hegemon’ in slow 
decline, and not a graceful one. As Joseph Nye phrased it, “all three twenty-first century 
presidents – Bush, Obama, Trump – resisted the metaphor of American decline while reacting 
to the rise of Asian powers such as China” (2019: 358). However, when analysing the foreign 
policy of these three presidents, cracks begin to appear as they strain to ignore their declining 
power.  
 One area where these fissures have become more apparent is in the elite political 
discourse surrounding Sino-African relations. Sino-African relations have experienced an 
inverse curve, rising exponentially as US hegemony has continued its slow decline. Thus, when 
the US began to criticize Sino-African relations, this was dismissed as an attempt by the US to 
maintain its hegemonic standing in Africa and largely escaped study.  
 While US pessimism surrounding Sino-African relations is often shown as a 
proportional reaction to increasing Chinese engagement with Africa, beginning with President 
Bush and culminating dramatically with the Trump administration, this ignores continuities 
and discontinuities exhibited by the three twenty-first century presidents. Upon closer 
examination, the US political discourse on Sino-African relations can illuminate how the US 
was attempting to project itself in the world at the time, and what role Africa, and indeed China, 
were expected to play in that attempt. 
 Much literature has dismissed US political discourse on Sino-African relations because 
it propagates many myths which have been widely discredited (see Brautigam, 2019b for myth-
busting of US discourse on Sino-African relations). What has thus far remained understudied 
is why the US continues to propagate these myths, and to what purpose. To fill this gap in the 
literature, this thesis will answer the question: how has the US representation of Sino-African 
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relations changed over time? Further, why has the US discourse surrounding Sino-African 
relations changed? 
Through the use of critical discourse analysis, this thesis will examine US political 
discourse on Sino-African relations from the twenty-first century US presidents. Rather than 
focusing on the ‘truthfulness’ of how the US has framed the Sino-African relationship, this 
study will use US political discourse to show the evolving self-image of the US-led liberal 
order, and how this has shaped how each administration has engaged with the issue of China 
in Africa. In turn, each of the three presidents studied here have reacted to this relationship in 
unique ways. While this reaction has long been painted as entirely pessimistic, the US trend of 
Sino-pessimism only began in earnest as the US began to lose confidence in the liberal world 
order.  
This thesis uses a post-structuralist framework, examining how those with discursive 
power manipulate discourse to their benefit. Despite the shift from uni-polarity to multi-
polarity currently taking place, the US still holds a significant amount of discursive power. 
Thus, a post-structuralist approach to US political discourse on Sino-African relations can 
reveal a deeper understanding of the existent power structures between the US and Africa and 
how they are evolving. This is a perspective which is oft ignored in the literature on Sino-
African relations, which often paints US discourse on Sino-African relations as static.   
The following section will be a review of pertinent academic literature on Sino-African 
relations. This review of academic literature is important because many of the themes studied 
in academic literature are also apparent in the political discourse reviewed later. This section 
has been divided into three threads of literature: Sino-optimism, Sino-pessimism, and Sino-
pragmatism. These categories provide a definition and an overview of the main arguments used 
by each of the actors who fall into these various categories, which will be used throughout the 
thesis. These three threads of scholarship will then be contextualized within the wider debate 
surrounding Sino-African relations.   
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Literature Review 
 
 
 
 
Analysing North-South relations has a rich history in academia. Due to the power disparities 
between North and South, it is also a field which is too often dominated by Northern 
representations of the South (see Amitav Acharya, 2013). The North has long sought to ‘know’ 
the South, and thereby create representations of those in the South. These representations are 
“imbued with unquestioned presumptions regarding the freedom, democracy, and self-
determination as well as the identities of the subjects who are entitled to enjoy these things” 
(Doty, 1996: 3). Within a post-structuralist framework, those doing the studying (the global 
North) are also revealing how they define themselves. Thus, these representations must be 
examined and critically assessed for what they can tell us not only about the subject being 
studied, but those who are performing the study. Given the hegemonic status of the US, analysis 
of US discourse unveils prevailing power structures and ‘regimes of truth’ created by those 
with discursive power. This study will first define the term ‘Sino-Africa’ as it will be used 
throughout this thesis, before reviewing the current literature on Sino-African relations to 
identify key debates taking place, and finally focusing in on the importance of US discourse 
on Sino-African relations.  
 When discussing the field of Sino-African relations, the problem of overgeneralization 
is made clear even within the titling of the discipline. When using the term ‘Sino-Africa’, the 
actors indicated by this term are unclear. For the purposes of this study, the ‘Sino’ half of this 
term will be used in the same manor it is used by US politicians, to indicate both public and 
private Chinese actors engaging with Africa. Thus, when US politicians criticise the Chinese, 
they are criticising both the limited amount of aid China extends to Africa, as well as the much 
more significant private sector investment. The ‘Africa’ half of this term will refer to Sub-
Saharan Africa. While Africa is a vast and diverse continent, within US political discourse it is 
often homogenized. A further opportunity for study could be analysing US discourse on 
China’s relationship with individual African nations, though unfortunately that is beyond the 
scope of this thesis.  
 In attempting to review the vast amount of scholarship conducted on Sino-African 
relations, three divergent schools of literature emerge. Using Adem’s (2010, 2013, 2016) 
categorization, these three research trends will be referred to as Sino-pessimism, Sino-
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optimism, and Sino-pragmatism. Turning first to Sino-pessimism, this is the rhetoric that is 
largely attributed to the US, and to a lesser extent the global North as a whole. Sino-pessimism 
has also been heavily represented in US news sources. Sino-pessimists have accused China of 
a whole rash of ill effects in Africa: undermining good governance and propping up 
authoritarian leaders (Naim, 2007), intentionally hindering industrialization (Power, 2008), 
bankrolling genocide, plundering natural resources, exploitation (both of labour and the 
environment) (Navarro, 2007), disregard for human rights (Breslin & Taylor, 2008), and 
neocolonialism (Langan, 2018), among others. Large (2008) similarly analyses Chinese non-
intervention in human rights abuses in African nations, rhetoric which is still being used by US 
politicians to criticize Sino-African relations. A key aspect of Sino-pessimism which the US 
increasingly draws from in political discourse is the idea of ‘debt trap diplomacy’, the idea that 
China is intentionally over-indebting African nations with the goal of being repaid with 
political favours in the case of default. The idea of debt-trap diplomacy emerged shortly after 
a Chinese company bought a controlling share of the Hambantota port from a heavily indebted 
Sri Lanka in 2017, which an Indian think tank dubbed as debt-book diplomacy and portrayed 
it as a security threat in the region (Brautigam, 2019a). Soon after this narrative emerged in 
early 2017, US political elites co-opted this language and continue to use it to this day. This is 
a view of Sino-African relations which is often examined through a lens of realist theory. The 
Sino-pessimistic academic literature often portrays trade with Africa as a zero-sum game 
between China and the US, in which China is grabbing an increasing portion of trade through 
nefarious business practices. Further, framing Sino-African relations as a threat to US security 
is also in keeping with the realist tradition, and a trend which has been prevalent within US 
political discourse since the Cold War (Kirshner, 2009; Yang, 2017). Sino-pessimists point to 
the tendency of Chinese firms to invest in energy and resource extraction as a threat to US 
interests in African resources (Kiggundu, 2008). Adem (2013) expands upon this, arguing that 
Sino-pessimists believe that Chinese resource extraction is intentionally cementing African 
nations position at the lowest rung of the global economic ladder as passive suppliers of natural 
resources, therefore opening them to Chinese coercion in the case of loan default or distress.  
 Sino-optimism arose as a critique of the negative discourse on Sino-African relations. 
In the early days of Sino-African research, coloured largely by the global financial crisis of 
2008 (from which China managed to emerge largely unaffected) academic studies on Chinese 
engagement in Africa focused on how the US or the West was affected by increased Sino-
African cooperation (Peng, 2018; Hirono & Suzuki, 2014). Prah (2007) discusses the hypocrisy 
of Western states criticizing Chinese engagement in Africa, given their long history of African 
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exploitation. Sino-optimists largely take issue with the portrayal of naïve, primitive African 
nations being exploited by cruel, immoral Chinese actors (Mawdsley, 2008; Jackson, 2012). In 
an attempt to counter this view, Mohan & Lampert (2013) find that African nations have a 
considerable amount of agency in their negotiations with China, and that this agency is often 
overlooked by Sino-pessimists. Sino-optimists compare and contrast how the US and China 
engage with Africa, citing the rhetoric of mutual benefit as well as respect evidenced by the 
latter as a motivator in choosing to engage with China (Friedman, 2009; Mohan & Power, 
2008; Haslam, Wang, & Deng, 2015). An AfroBarometer survey published in 2016 also shows 
that China has a largely popular perception in Africa. The recent, rapid economic development 
of China, alongside massive poverty reduction, gives African nations a role model for their 
own development and poverty reduction (Friedman, 2009). Sino-optimists point to the tangible 
impacts of Chinese engagement: advanced infrastructure and economic development, free from 
the political conditionalities typically imposed by Western lenders, as beneficial to African 
nations (Sautman & Hairong, 2007). It should also be noted that, despite its prevalence within 
the Sino-pessimism discourse, there is a lack of evidence that China is intentionally 
overburdening nations with debt, and in fact the Chinese are taking steps to mitigate the effects 
of over-indebtedness, as well as becoming more cautious in their lending practices (Malm, 
2016). Additionally, in response to international criticism, China has been adjusting its 
practices to fall more in line with international standards.  When announcing the formation of 
the Chinese International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA), which would formally 
separate developmental aid from other forms of capital flow, Beijing stressed CIDCA’s 
importance for their perceived legitimacy internationally (Rudyak, 2019). Sino-optimists point 
to the case of Venezuela, a country that has been defaulting on their Chinese resource-backed 
loans for over four years, much to the detriment of Chinese economic and strategic interests, 
as proof that the debt-trap narrative does not hold weight (Kratz, Feng, & Wright, 2019). Today, 
many African leaders and political elites espouse Sino-optimist views (Adem, 2016). These 
views align with a liberal economic perspective, citing that even if China is gaining more from 
the relationship than African states, increased economic activity is beneficial to both parties 
(Adem, 2010).  
 Situated between Sino-pessimism and Sino-optimism, we have Sino-pragmatism. Sino-
pragmatists believe that Sino-African relations can be both beneficial and negative, owing to 
the overwhelming amount of Chinese economic activity on the African continent. Deborah 
Brautigam concludes her myth-busting book on Sino-African relations with “China’s rise in 
Africa is cause for some concern, but […] many of the fears about Chinese aid and engagement 
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are misinformed, the alarm out of proportion” (2009: 307). While Sino-pragmatists 
acknowledge that African leaders have agency, they would also argue that few nations are able 
to exercise it in a beneficial manner (Carmody & Kragelund, 2016). Sino-pragmatists accept 
Chinese rhetoric of respect and mutual benefit, though they would argue that their actions rarely 
live up to their rhetoric (Alden & Alves, 2008; Alden, Large, & Soares de Oliveira, 2008). 
Sino-pragmatists argue that China is engaging with Africa to further their own economic 
interests (which is a sentiment often expressed by the Chinese themselves) (Drogendijk & 
Blomkvist, 2013). While the Chinese may be supplying infrastructure and the physical means 
for economic development, many African actors lack the efficient institutions required to be 
able to use these to their benefit (Sindzingre, 2011; Lampert & Mohan, 2014).  On the issue of 
debt management, the IMF (2019) recommends the implementation of more cautious sovereign 
debt management schemes in emerging economies to avoid over-indebtedness. In a 2019 paper, 
Kratz, Feng & Wright examine 40 cases of Chinese debt renegotiation and found that the most 
common outcome of these negotiations is debt-forgiveness, followed by deferment. The only 
case of asset seizure (a loose term in this context, given that it took place in the private sector) 
they found was the Hambantota port in Sri Lanka, though following the international backlash 
from the acquisition of that port, it seems unlikely that China would choose to go that route 
again given their history of course correcting in the face of international criticism. Indeed, as 
mentioned previously, the Sino-Venezuelan case disproves this debt-trap narrative, as China 
has not seized any assets as a means of recovering overdue payments. In this way, Sino-
pragmatists cover a wide range of theoretical traditions. The overarching theme within Sino-
pragmatism remains that China is supplying capital and infrastructure, but it is up to individual 
African nations and the institutions within them to craft policies or develop institutions that 
ensure they benefit from engagement with China (Oyejide et al., 2009).  
Few academics now will write from a purely optimistic or pessimistic view on Sino-
African relations. Many acknowledge the position of Sino-pragmatism, with many believing 
that it is too soon to know the outcome of Chinese engagement with Africa. Due to the sheer 
amount of Chinese economic activity within Africa, as well as the variety of ways China 
engages with Africa, claiming that Chinese engagement is entirely negative or positive would 
be near impossible. Despite this, political discourse remains largely bipolar on the issue. There 
is a common sentiment that US political leaders and statesmen are largely Sino-pessimistic, 
while African leaders are largely Sino-optimistic. However, as Sino-African relations have 
evolved, so too have the positions of both African and American politicians.  
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When researching Sino-African relations, there is also a temporal dimension. Almost 
all of the literature supporting Sino-pessimism is from the mid-aughts. As research has 
advanced and China’s influence becomes more apparent, Sino-pragmatism and, to a lesser 
extent, Sino-optimism becomes more prevalent. This temporal dimension is also represented 
in the political discourse. During the height of academic Sino-pessimism (the early aughts) the 
Bush administration was pursuing active engagement with China in Africa, more accurately 
classified as Sino-optimism. Conversely, the Trump administration employs a colourful form 
of Sino-pessimism, at a time when academia is beginning to carve out a more nuanced view of 
Sino-African relations.  
In the Sino-African context, US discourse takes on an even more important role. The 
discourse on Sino-African relations is heavily influenced by rumour and mischaracterizations 
which spread widely and quickly. These rumours have been spread by international as well as 
national actors and are quickly taken up by local media. Hairong and Sautman (2012) studied 
the pervasive rumour that Chinese labour in African infrastructure projects was largely 
performed by imported Chinese prisoners. They found that the rumour was first given 
credibility in 1991 when Roberta Cohen, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Human 
Rights, stated that 75% of labour for an infrastructure project in Benin was performed by 
Chinese prison labour. Although the rumour that Chinese labourers in Africa are prisoners has 
since been de-bunked, it still remains prevalent to this day.  
Additionally, there are frequent rumours that the Chinese will be repossessing various 
projects such as the state-run electricity company in Zambia (another rumour further 
propagated by a high-ranking US politician), or a port in Mombasa, due to loan default (Lusaka 
Times, 2018; Niba, 2019). In the case of the Mombasa port, the alleged leaked contract (later 
proven to have been falsified) included the clause “neither the borrower nor any of its assets is 
entitled to any right of immunity based on the grounds of sovereignty” (Niba, 2019), echoing 
the common US narrative of loss of sovereignty due to failure to repay Chinese loans. In this 
way, US political discourse is shaping the perception and reporting of Chinese actions within 
the Africa continent. To this day US politicians continue to espouse myths about Sino-African 
relations which have long been debunked, only to be given new life in African media. 
An easy explanation for why US discourse is Sino-pessimistic would be that Chinese 
economic interests in Africa are in direct competition with US economic interests, however 
this is rarely the case. Within the realm of aid the US typically invests in health, education, and 
security whereas China typically invests in economic or infrastructure projects (OECD Stats, 
2019; Dreher et al., 2019). In October of 2018, the US announced the Better Utilization of 
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Investment Leading to Development (BUILD) act, which would allocate US$ 60 billion of 
funding for development projects in developing countries (OPIC, 2018). The timing of this was 
viewed with suspicion, coming a mere month after China had announced US$ 60 billion of 
funding for projects in Africa (Pilling, 2018). However, even these two sources of funding vary 
widely in which projects would be eligible for financing. While the Chinese funding would 
cover large scale infrastructure, the BUILD act would cover business and private enterprise. 
Therefore, even when the US and China engage in economic development within Africa their 
approaches are complementary, given that the lack of infrastructure is a serious hinderance to 
attracting international investment. Swedlund (2017) finds in a large-scale survey of 
developmental actors on the ground that China and the US rarely come into direct competition 
with one another. Given their divergent interests within the African continent the ways in which 
China and the US engage could be seen as complementary, with the US engaging with social 
concerns and China engaging with economic concerns.  
Thus, while academic research can be categorized into Sino-optimism, -pessimism, and 
-pragmatism, political discourse is more difficult to neatly categorize. Furthermore, political 
discourse is often contradictory. The political aspect of political discourse must also be 
acknowledged, given that diplomats often uses discourse to mask the true intentions of a state 
(van Dijk, 1998). Given the complementary approach to aid and investment practiced by China 
and the US in Africa, the question of why US political discourse continues to attempt to 
undermine China on the continent must be addressed. Although the US criticisms regarding 
Sino-African relations have been debunked, US politicians continue to propagate the same 
myths. Despite years of criticism, Africa has continued to engage with China at an increasing 
pace. Therefore, this research paper will examine why the US has continued to employ the 
same rhetoric when framing Sino-African relations, along with why changes have occurred. 
Post-structuralist critical discourse analysis (CDA) will be utilized to track the evolution of US 
discourse on Sino-African relations, which will be outlined in the following section.  
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Methodology 
 
 
Post-structuralism begins with the basic tenet that the social world is constructed through 
discourse, and that those in power manipulate discourse to their benefit. Therefore, the more 
powerful the voice the more influence an actor may have in shaping global narratives or 
representations. In this framework, power is productive and has the ability to shape the 
representation of actors, which in turn dictate what behaviour is appropriate or inappropriate 
for actors (McMorrow, 2018). The creation of dominant representations is a show of 
hegemonic power which is a two-way process, as how we define the other is a representation 
of how we define ourselves and our social relations (Fairclough, 2012). In this study a 
Foucauldian definition of discourse will be employed, with discourse being defined as 
communicative acts and how these communicative acts relate to, and make possible, non-
discursive action (Anaïs, 2013).  
 The methodology used for this study will be a CDA, drawing on concepts from 
Foucault’s genealogy. Due the limited size of this study, a full genealogy is beyond the scope 
of this study. Further, Foucault imagined his methods as a ‘toolbox’, for a researcher to pick or 
discard as they found useful which makes genealogy a useful tool for mixed-methodology 
studies (Dreyfus & Rainbow, 1983).  
CDA will largely be employed as method, whereas genealogy will be used as 
methodology. While CDA attempts to uncover how knowledge and relations are shaped by 
discourse, genealogy goes a step further by including power or hegemony in the analysis of 
knowledge production and the formation of representations (Fairclough, 2012; Anaïs, 2013). 
Genealogy is a useful tool because it stresses the study of both discourse and what actions it 
legitimizes, rather than studying text or practice in isolation (Anaïs, 2013). CDA (emphasis on 
the C) will be used rather than discourse analysis because of the expository nature of criticism. 
As Foucault argued, “a critique is not a matter of saying that things are not right as they are [… 
it] is a matter of flushing out that thought and trying to change it: to show that things are not as 
self-evident as one believed” (1988: 154-155). As a starting point, genealogy problematizes a 
practice and attempts to find ruptures, or singular disruptions in acceptable practice or 
discourse, at which point a regime of truth begins to destabilize. Regimes of truth can be 
understood as the dominant discursive framing of a topic, the strength, or weakness, of which 
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is illustrated by its ability to shut out conflicting frames (McMorrow, 2018). This study seeks 
to understand how the Sino-pessimism espoused by US politicians has become destabilized, 
how it is no longer as self-evident as once believed. 
 The method used for this study will consist of three steps, inspired by Anaïs’ writings 
on combining genealogy and CDA (2013). Step one will be assembling an archive of discourse 
to be analysed. A genealogical archive would strive to be all encompassing, however in CDA 
it is common practice to place limitations on the scope of the archive. In this case, the first 
limitation will be that the discourse studied will come from high-level US government officials 
in the Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations discussing Sino-African relations, paying 
particular attention to economic relations and policy announcements. This discourse will be 
read through once, accepting the discourse at face value.  
 The second step will be a second reading of the discourse, this time striving to identify 
emergent themes and trends. It will also allow for the analysis of the social structures, as well 
as non-discursive action, present behind the discourse. Largely this study will focus on themes 
and trends in the content of the political discourse analysed. This second reading will aim to 
destabilize accepted truths (McMorrow, 2018) and will attempt to find contradictions, either 
between discourse or between discourse and action, as well as what these contradictions can 
tell us of how the US has attempted to construct their international framing.  
 Although this second step shares several similarities with a contrapuntal analysis as 
theorized by Chowdhry (2007), a choice was made not to utilize a post-colonial methodology. 
Acknowledging the privilege of the author of this thesis as a white student in the Global North, 
and an American at that, the subaltern voice is one perhaps more appropriately explored by a 
member of the subaltern. This said, a contrapuntal analysis of the use of US political rhetoric 
on the ground in Africa would be a fascinating project, though unfortunately one beyond the 
scope of this thesis.  
 The third step taken will be ‘reading for silence’ (Anaïs, 2013). This attempts to 
uncover what goes unsaid in the discourse. This includes binary opposition, such as good 
versus evil, or us versus them dichotomies. These binaries create representations of both the 
subject and the object of discourse and must be thoroughly interrogated to reveal why they have 
been constructed in this way (Doty, 1996). This questions the assumption that these 
representations are natural, or independent of discursive practice and power.  
 Discourse can serve as a window to observe the power structures of representation 
present between states. The aim of analysing political discourse on Sino-African relations is to 
go further than the materialist reading of the US attempting to counter Chinese hegemonic 
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advances. Through the use of CDA, the underlying representations present in the discourse, 
along with the actions they legitimize, are laid bare.  
The focus of this study will be the Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations. Although 
the Sino-African relationship stretches back centuries and has inspired several articles (see 
Brautigam, 2009 & Chan, 2013), this is a subject beyond the scope of this study. This study 
seeks to understand how this relationship has been discursively framed by US political actors. 
Further, the choice to focus on the twenty-first century presidents was made because only 
within the past two decades has China replaced Western powers as the largest influence 
(economically) on the continent. Thus, these are the three presidents who have engaged with 
the construction of the modern framing of the Sino-Africa relationship within US political 
discourse. Due to the size of this study, the main focus will be on elite political actors from the 
US. Given more time or space, including more African actors, political and from civil society, 
would illuminate a more complete understanding of how the US discourse has shaped relations.  
 This methodology will be applied in the following section. The analysis section will 
begin first by establishing continuities between the framing of Sino-African relations by the 
Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations. This will illuminate the discursive framing of how 
the US sees itself as an actor in Africa. The analysis will then move onto the discontinuities 
within the US framing of Sino-African relations, as well as explaining why these discursive 
changes have taken place.  
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Analysis 
 
 
Continuities 
 
 Moral Superiority & Paternalism 
  
The Africa inherited by President Bush from President Clinton was one entirely defined by 
what James Ferguson dubbed ‘Africa talk’, “it is never just Africa, but always the crisis in 
Africa, the problems of Africa, the failure of Africa, the moral challenge of Africa to ‘the 
international community’’' (2006: 2).  A 2000 edition of The Economist portrayed Africa as 
‘The Hopeless Continent’, a place defined by poverty, disease, corruption, and war. Even 
President Clinton, who was popularly perceived in Africa, was plagued by a legacy of missteps 
in Africa. President Clinton oversaw the bombing of a ‘chemical weapons’ factory in the 
Sudan, which was in fact a pharmaceutical manufacturer. Further, President Clinton was 
criticized for both his disastrous intervention in Somalia, and his failure to intervene in the 
Rwandan genocide (Tukur, Hyson, & Bennett 2000). When Colin Powell, Secretary of State 
for George W. Bush, remarked in 2001 that “I don’t think we can ever say that the West will 
get tired of Africa. We’re not going to be given that luxury. The problem is so great that it will 
be a problem for the world and a problem for the West for a long time to come” (DOS, 2001), 
he is referring to an Africa defined by problems. Problems that, despite the best intentions of 
the US, are destined to remain a moral challenge to the West. Consequently, when China 
entered the scene in Africa, it may have been met with a sense of relief, a sense that China was 
finally helping to shoulder the ‘problem of Africa’. 
 Contrary to how it was portrayed in popular media, and in much academic literature as 
well, the US was not immediately wary of Chinese engagement in Africa. The Bush 
administration demonstrated a fair amount of Sino-optimism. This was owed largely to a belief 
that the US would be able to shape Chinese engagement with Africa to match Western, liberal 
engagement. This was made evident when Jendayi Frazer, Bush’s Assistant Secretary of State 
for the Bureau of African Affairs, held a sub-dialogue with Beijing to discuss China’s plans for 
Africa (Raine, 2009). Frazer would later remark “I think there’s a coming together, a consensus 
approach on how to deal with Africa’s development” (C-SPAN, 2006). It is pertinent to note 
that at the sub-dialogue referenced, there is no evidence of an African presence (Raine, 2009). 
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Thus, the paternalism practiced by the Bush administration extended to shaping China as a 
responsible stakeholder in Africa, thus legitimizing the Chinese presence on the continent. 
Assistant Secretary Frazer’s phrasing that China and the US have come together to ‘deal with’ 
Africa is also telling and reveals the limited role the Bush administration envisions for Africans 
in solving the ‘problem’ of Africa. Rather than framing African development as solely an 
American project, as previous administrations had done, it was now a joint venture between 
China and the US.  
 Despite this framing of Africa’s development as a partnership between the US and 
China, the US still maintained a sense of moral superiority in the relationship. This was made 
clear when James Swan, President Bush’s Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau 
of African Affairs, remarked “we engage at multiple levels to influence Chinese actions on 
issues such as good governance, human rights, and transparency – issues that we believe should 
play as prominent a role in Chinese Africa policy as in ours” (DOS, 2008a). Thus, while the 
Bush administration welcomed China’s engagement with Africa, the US also reasserted their 
role as the ‘gatekeeper’ of Africa, fulfilling their self-imposed role as the final authority on the 
appropriate way to engage with Africa. 
 The Bush administration’s claim to moral superiority was grounded on the use of 
conditionality-based aid, typically tying aid to liberal reform. As Deputy Assistant Secretary 
Swan remarked, “observers have warned that China’s assistance efforts in Africa, which 
emphasize ‘no strings’ and are not predicated on the same kinds of conditionality as other 
countries’ aid programs, could endanger progress in promoting good governance and market 
reform in Africa” (DOS, 2008a). However, the use of conditionalities has long been seen as 
ineffective (see Easterly, 2006). In fact, the liberal conditionalities employed by the IMF and 
World Bank in the 1970s saw the decimation of many African economies (Singer, 1989). These 
conditionalities coerce nations into adopting liberalizing policy prescriptions, often times 
against their own best interests (Morrisey, 2004; Montinola, 2010). They also allow for further 
expressions of paternalism, as the US is able to leverage the provision of aid to bend African 
states to their will.  
 Like the Bush administration, the Obama administration would engage with Africa 
using discourse laden with paternalism and moral superiority. Johnnie Carson, Obama’s 
Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of African Affairs, warned in 2010 that “it is up to 
African governments to manage carefully their relationship with the Chinese […] we ask both 
sides to be responsible partners in the process” (DOS, 2010a). This reinforces the same 
narrative of the US as the gatekeepers of Africa – although this time the US is positioning itself 
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to guarantee that both African and Chinese actors are behaving appropriately. This also 
illustrated the Obama administration’s shift towards Sino-pessimism, as the US begun to frame 
China as an untrustworthy actor that Africa should be wary of. This narrative was further 
enforced in 2014 when Ben Rhodes, Obama’s Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic 
Communications, remarked “we welcome other nations being invested in Africa, and, frankly, 
China can play a constructive role in areas like developing infrastructure” (White House, 2014). 
The discourse used by Advisor Rhodes attempts to ‘welcome’ China into Africa, after more 
than six decades of formal Sino-African diplomatic relations, while demarcating areas the US 
finds appropriate for Chinese involvement, further enforcing the position of the Obama 
administration as the director of Africa’s development.  
 While the Bush administration’s claim to moral superiority rested on conditionalities, 
the Obama administration’s claim to moral superiority relied on the rhetoric of positioning the 
US as a superior actor to China. In a leaked diplomatic telegram from 2010, Assistant Secretary 
Carson warned a Nigerian trade delegation that “China is a very aggressive and pernicious 
competitor with no morals. China is not in Africa for altruistic reasons. China is in Africa for 
China primarily” (Blair, 2010). Reading this in the negative gives the impression that the US 
is in Africa for purely altruistic reasons, an image that the Obama administration was quick to 
project. It should be noted that Assistant Secretary Carson was in Nigeria negotiating an oil 
deal and remarked how oil made Nigeria the “most important country in Africa for the United 
States” (Blair, 2010), a seemingly less than altruistic mission.  
 The Obama administration consistently framed falling US imports of African oil as a 
moral virtue. Advisor Rhodes remarked in 2014 that the US is “less focused on resources from 
Africa and more focused on deepening trade and investment relations” (White House, 2014). 
However, the Obama administration oversaw a steep decline in trade with Africa. From a high 
in 2008, when the US imported over US$ 113 billion in goods from Africa, to the time of 
Advisor Rhode’s remark in 2014, US imports from Africa had fallen to US$ 34 billion, a 
volume of trade last seen in 2002 (US Census, 2020). Further, the rhetoric of focusing more on 
trade is a continuity from the Bush administration, as illustrated when President Bush remarked 
in 2002 that “trade is the engine of development. And by promoting it, we will help meet the 
needs of the world’s poor” (White House, 2002).  
 This rhetoric of the moral superiority of free trade and globalisation has long been the 
justification for the US liberalising mission. With the introduction of China into Africa, and 
falling African oil imports to the US, this rhetoric began to shift slightly. The Obama 
administration would stress, in contrast to China, how “Africa needs partnership, not patronage 
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[…] a model of sustainable partnership that adds value rather than extracts it” as Secretary 
Clinton, President Obama’s Secretary of State, remarked (DOS, 2012b). President Obama 
similarly remarked that “economic relationships can’t simply be about building countries’ 
infrastructure with foreign labour or extracting Africa’s natural resources. Real economic 
partnerships have to be a good deal for Africa” (White House, 2015). By using this rhetoric, 
the Obama administration reasserted its claims of adjudicating the legitimacy of actors within 
Africa, determining what is or is not a ‘real economic partnership’.  
The Trump administration continued espousing the rhetoric of the moral superiority of 
free trade and private enterprise. As Mark Green, Administrator of the US Agency for 
International Development (USAID) under President Trump, remarked “private enterprise is 
the single most powerful force on Earth, lifting lives and building communities” (USAID, 
2019). Interestingly, the man chosen to spread this message of corporate morality was Rex 
Tillerson, former chief executive of Exxon, and brief Secretary of State to President Trump. In 
March of 2018 Secretary Tillerson embarked on a multi-day tour of Africa. During his trip, 
Secretary Tillerson took the opportunity to repeatedly lecture African dignitaries about the 
dangers of doing business with China, “which encourages dependency using opaque contracts, 
predatory loan practices, and corrupt deals that mire nations in debt and undercut their 
sovereignty” (DOS, 2018a). Perhaps Secretary Tillerson was speaking from personal 
experience, having been implicated in dealings designed to skirt anti-corruption measures in 
Liberia during his time at Exxon (Paterson, Olson, & Grimaldi, 2018).  
If one were to judge US involvement in the African oil sector based on political 
discourse, one might conclude that the US has completely divested from oil extraction in 
Africa. Tibor Nagy, President Trump’s Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of African 
Affairs, expounded the virtues of US investors as socially and environmentally responsible 
(DOS, 2019a). President Trump’s second Secretary of State Michael Pompeo, during a visit to 
Ethiopia in February of 2020 remarked that “our track record of being a force for good when 
we invest economically is unchallenged” (DOS, 2020b). A day later Secretary Pompeo would 
stress “The United States stands for […] environmental responsibility […] We stand for true 
partnership, true economic liberation” (DOS, 2020c). These statements were made on the 18th 
and 19th of February, respectively. On the 17th of February, Secretary Pompeo announced a 
US$ 2 billion US investment package for offshore natural gas extraction in Angola (DOS, 
2020a), a decidedly ‘unclean’ area of investment.  
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American Exceptionalism 
 
The current running through all of this rhetoric of the moral superiority and paternalism 
towards Africa is a deep sense of American exceptionalism. The sense that, left to its own 
devices, Africa is unable to stand on its own two feet. Africa without America would be 
doomed to remain the ‘dark continent’, a place without a decent life of “democracy, good 
governance and transparency” (DOS, 2007a) that only America is able to provide. When it 
became apparent that the US would not be able to dictate China’s Africa policy, China became 
the newest ‘problem’ of Africa, the latest in a long line of problems the US would have to solve 
for Africa. When discussing emerging powers, Secretary Clinton remarked “the simple fact is 
that no significant global challenge can be met without us” (DOS, 2010b). John Kerry, 
President Obama’s second Secretary of State, remarked “what we bring to the table is frankly 
a lot more attractive than what other countries bring to the table” (C-SPAN, 2013). Assistant 
Secretary Nagy remarked “we are reminding Africans that no one can match America’s 
contributions” (Bureau of African Affairs, 2020). All of these lend into a narrative that the US 
feels that, despite all the ‘help’ the US has given to Africa over the years, Africa is acting as a 
petulant child, quick to forget who their real ally has been. 
Nayak & Malone (2009) define American exceptionalism as an unshakeable belief that 
the US is unique, ordained with a mission to reshape the world in its own image. This sense of 
exceptionalism explains why the US discourse on Sino-African relations is so contradictory. 
The US, as a singular hegemon, has long seen itself as the supplier of criticism rather than the 
subject of it. Therefore, when the Trump administration sends a corrupt oil executive to lecture 
African leaders of the dangers of corrupt Chinese investors, the specific messenger is of less 
import than the fact that it is an American messenger. Thus, when the Obama administration is 
cutting oil deals in Nigeria, this is not extractive in the same sense as Chinese oil deals, due to 
the US confirming that it is a ‘real economic partnership’. And finally, when the Bush 
administration attempts to nudge China into promoting democracy, human rights, and 
transparency in Africa, the fact that the US promotion of these ideals has had little impact is of 
less importance than the American belief in these ideals.  
This exceptionalism has also justified the US in criticising the Sino-African 
relationship. During all three twenty-first century administrations there was an overarching 
narrative that, with this president, Africa was finally being listened to. President Bush remarked 
“America is on a mission of mercy. We’re treating African leaders as equal partners” (White 
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House, 2008). President Obama remarked “I’ve worked to transform America’s relationship 
with Africa – so that we’re truly listening to our African friends and working together as equal 
partners” (White House, 2015). Michael Pompeo, President Trump’s second Secretary of State, 
contrasted this approach with that of China when he remarked “not every nation doing business 
in Africa from outside the continent adopts the American model of partnership” (DOS, 2020c).  
Despite this rhetoric of partnership and equality, the paternalism and moral superiority 
exhibited by all three administrations makes it clear that this is not a partnership of equals, that 
Africa is not being listened to but lectured. This demonstrates the discursive power these three 
administrations believed that they held and were trying to maintain. By using this rhetoric of 
finally achieving equal partnership, the US would be able to operate on the same basis of moral 
superiority and paternalism it has long employed when engaging with Africa, while the 
partnership has exhibited few fundamental changes. Now, having highlighted the discursive 
basis upon which the Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations have built the US-Africa 
relationship, this paper will move onto the discontinuities in the discourse, and why these have 
taken place.  
 
Discontinuities 
 
Bush-era Sino-Optimism 
 
Of the three presidents analysed by this study, none have shown a more zealous belief in the 
expansion of the liberal order than President Bush. The 1990s had brought two significant 
events which cemented the supremacy of the US-led liberal order: the end of the Cold War, 
marking the ‘end of history’ and the ‘final universalization’ of Western liberal democracy as 
theorized by Francis Fukuyama in 1992. Secondly, the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) proved 
that Western capitalism was the superior economic model, a sentiment perhaps best captured 
by Mortimer Zuckerman’s A Second American Century in a 1998 edition of Foreign Affairs. 
Consequently, when President Bush took office, the hegemonic standing of liberalism seemed 
assured. 
 However, after 9/11 the liberal order, and the peace it promised to bring, was under 
threat. The Bush administration was made acutely aware that poverty could create discontent 
strong enough to make itself known in the global North. Post 9/11 the Bush administration 
pursued the expansion of the liberal order with a religious zeal, using force where necessary. 
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As the 9/11 Commission Report phrased it, “the American homeland is the planet” (2004). In 
Africa this resulted in several programs to bring liberal development to Africa. For an account 
of the Millennium Challenge Corporation, President Bush’s most ambitious foray into 
economic development policy, and the extent to which it brought liberal reform rather than 
development see Soederberg, 2004.  
 The preoccupation of the Bush administration with the War on Terror also explains why 
the Bush administration only began engaging with the issue of China in Africa in 2005. As 
previously stated, the Bush administration initially met China in Africa with a surprising 
amount of optimism. This can be attributed to the Bush administrations increased focus on 
international security and stability post 9/11, when China was reframed as a ‘strategic partner’ 
rather than a ‘strategic competitor’ (Sutter, 2003). Therefore, the Bush administration believed 
that it would be able to “continue efforts to nudge China toward becoming a responsible 
international stakeholder” in Africa, as framed by Claudia Anyaso, President Bush’s Director 
of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs for the Bureau of African Affairs (DOS, 2007a). This 
revealed the confidence that the Bush administration held in the liberal order, a confidence that 
China would inevitably adopt liberal norms and become, in the judgement of the US, a 
legitimate actor in Africa. This optimism was perhaps best expressed when Deputy Assistant 
Secretary Swan remarked “China has even modelled many of its engagement programs after 
very successful US exchanges on the continent” (DOS, 2008a). The self-image the Bush 
administration sought to exude was one of optimism in the liberal order, which extended to the 
Bush-era discourse on Sino-Africa relations.  
 Thus, when the Bush administration critiqued China for how it engaged with Africa, 
these were dismissed as the growing pains of a newly liberalized state. Director Anyaso 
expressed several areas of concern for the US regarding China in Africa: the lack of local job 
creation, lack of concern for environmental and labour standards, and their apparent disregard 
for spreading the liberal norms of human rights and good governance (DOS, 2008b). Despite 
this, Director Anyaso stressed that “China’s presence in Africa is not a zero-sum game for the 
United States […] we are urging China to engage cooperatively with international donors for 
a rules-based approach to aid” (DOS, 2008b).  
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A Turn Toward Sino-Pessimism 
  
A fascinating discontinuity happened between the Bush and Obama administration, when, 
using the criticisms about China in Africa utilized by the Bush administration, the Obama 
administration shifted dramatically towards pessimism regarding China in Africa. President 
Obama remarked in 2015 that “real economic partnerships have to be a good deal for Africa – 
they have to create jobs and capacity for Africans” (White House, 2015). Secretary Clinton, 
when asked about Chinese investment in Africa, stressed that “investments in Africa should be 
sustainable and for the benefit of the African people” later adding “we don’t want them to 
undermine good governance” (DOS, 2011). As Assistant Secretary Carson framed it, “The 
Chinese are dealing with the Mugabe’s and Bashir’s of the world, which is a contrarian political 
model” (Blair, 2010). This illustrates the continuity within the discourse on China in Africa 
between the Bush and Obama administrations: lack of job creation, sustainability, and good 
governance. It also illustrates that during the Obama administration, the discourse shifted from 
what the US was doing in Africa, to what the US was doing better than China in Africa.  
However, during an interview in Zambia, Secretary Clinton goes a step further than the 
Bush administration and espouses powerful Sino-pessimism. Secretary Clinton remarked “it is 
easy – and we saw that during colonial times – it is easy to come in, take out natural resources, 
pay off leaders, and leave. And when you leave, you don’t leave much behind for the people 
who are there […] We don’t want to see a new colonialism in Africa [emphasis added]” (DOS, 
2011). Equating Chinese engagement with Africa to European colonialism is offensive and 
dismissive of the shear brutality experienced by the African continent during that period. 
President Obama, who narrated his ancestor’s treatment at the hands of colonial officers when 
addressing the African Union in 2015, should be particularly aware of the insensitivity of this 
comment. Moreover, this ignores the discursive aspect of colonialism: a belief in an ideological 
superiority (Nkrumah, 1965), such as the moral superiority or paternalism the US has long 
practiced in their engagement with Africa. The very fact that Secretary Clinton would warn of 
a new colonialism in Africa reflects the overarching narrative that Africa cannot take care of 
itself and must be guided by the US, particularly when dealing with a ‘pernicious actor’ such 
as China.  
 While the Bush administration exhibited optimism in attempting to shape China into a 
responsible stakeholder in Africa, accusing China of ‘a new colonialism’ marks a shift away 
from the rhetoric of welcoming China into Africa. This casual accusation of colonialism 
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exposes a lack of confidence on behalf of the Obama administration. Name calling is rarely the 
first resort of a confident actor. When President Bush entered office, the eventual universality 
of the liberal order seemed all but inevitable. However, when President Obama entered office 
the liberal order was facing two of its most difficult trials to date, the first being the global 
financial crisis of 2008 (GFC). While the AFC reinforced the supremacy of Western capitalism, 
the GFC exposed the weaknesses of the US-led liberal economic order. Further, China emerged 
from the GFC relatively unscathed, suggesting that an alternative economic model to Western 
capitalism could be found in China, one less prone to global crisis. Indeed, as previously 
mentioned, US imports from Africa fell by more than half between 2008 to 2009 (US Census, 
2020). This fall in African imports made 2009 the first year China surpassed the US as Africa’s 
largest trading partner (Dews, 2016).  
 Moreover, the Obama administration was facing a second, concurrent crisis of 
legitimacy. Burdened with the widely criticised War on Terror initiated by the Bush 
administration, the US was losing popularity through the continuance of what was increasingly 
viewed as an illegal war, as declared by Kofi Annan in 2004, (MacAskill & Borger, 2004). The 
Bush administration exhibited their own hubris through unilateral actions post-9/11, of pre-
emptively imposing liberalism as a ‘stabilising force’. As was evident by the time President 
Obama took office, the stabilising force of liberalism had not gone to plan, with international 
perception shifting against the US as the War on Terror seemed intractable. Thus, the liberal 
order inherited by the Obama administration faced challenges on two fronts: the GFC had 
proven the weakness of the liberal economic order, while the backlash from the War on Terror 
showed that the Bush administration’s attempt at spreading liberalism was flawed, as well as 
proving that the US was not immune to international criticism.  
Interestingly, this negative perception of the US did not extend to Africa. In a 2009 
AfroBarometer survey of 20 African nations 76% of correspondents saw the US as helping 
somewhat or a lot in their countries. This can be partly attributed to the success of the Bush 
administration’s Africa policies, which had made the Bush administration popular in Africa 
(Dlamini, 2018). This can also be partly attributed to President Obama’s African heritage. 
President Obama was quick to position himself as a ‘son of Africa’ (DOS, 2012b). The election 
of the first president of colour in the US led to a wave of Obamamania in Africa which, paired 
with the positive African legacy of the Bush administration, meant that the Obama 
administration could pay minimal attention to Africa while retaining their positive perception 
on the continent. This was made evident when Assistant Secretary Carson noted “The United 
States’ reputation is stable, and its popularity is the highest in Africa compared to anywhere 
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else in the world. Obama has helped increase that influence” (Blair, 2010). Consequently, the 
Obama administration was free to continue the same paternalism practiced during the Bush-
era, paradoxically repackaged as the sage advice of a ‘son of Africa’, paired with a continuation 
of Bush-era African policies, while ‘increasing the influence’ of the US on the continent.  
  At the intersection of all these influences, we see the Obama administration’s shift to 
Sino-pessimism emerge. Interestingly, President Obama was committed to shifting US policy 
away from the Middle East towards Asia and expressed interest in developing significant 
cooperation with China (Nye, 2019). Despite this increased interest in Sino-US cooperation, 
we see the Obama administration consistently attempting to delegitimize Chinese engagement 
with Africa. The Obama administration, in attempting to leave behind the image of Bush-era 
unilateralism, moved towards a more cosmopolitan version of liberalism, what one White 
House official referred to as “leading from behind” (Nye, 2019: 369). The Sino-pessimism of 
China in Africa demonstrated by the Obama administration would seem at odds with this goal 
of greater international cooperation, of the cosmopolitan self-image the Obama administration 
sought to project. This hints at the diminished confidence the Obama administration had in the 
liberal order. Through criticism and attempts at delegitimization, the Obama administration 
acknowledged that their discursive power in Africa was not as self-evident as it was during the 
Bush administration. Thus, rather than China being an ally in liberalising Africa, China was 
painted as not only a threat to the liberalisation of Africa, but a threat to Africa’s very freedom, 
as Secretary Clinton implied by accusing China of neo-colonialism.  
These accusations of neo-colonialism did not dissipate with the end of the Obama 
administration: it was picked up with even more enthusiasm by the Trump administration. 
While the Trump administration moved away from the term colonialism, the ‘debt trap’ 
narrative discussed during the literature review was, and is, frequently referenced by members 
of the Trump administration. As explained by Secretary Tillerson, Chinese “financing models 
are structured in a way that the country, when it gets into trouble financially, loses control of 
its own infrastructure or its own resources through default” (DOS, 2018b). Alternatively, 
Manisha Singh, President Trumps Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs, 
perhaps most accurately described this American narrative when she remarked “every time we 
see a deal where the Chinese Government goes in to help – and I put “help” in quotes […] we 
always advise them, look, you might want to think about what you’re giving up here. The – I 
always say the choice is not between America and China, the choice is between China and your 
own sovereignty” (DOS, 2019b). This form of criticism seems to come from a shallow 
understanding of the colonial legacy in Africa. By portraying China as a threat to sovereignty, 
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it attempts to trigger colonial resentment against China. However, by consistently criticising 
Africa’s relationship with China, particularly through the use of debunked myths, the Trump 
administration is failing to acknowledge the superiority they are exhibiting. Further, this 
framing ignored the role of African agency in determining their own affairs, as well as ignoring 
the importance agency holds for post-colonial African states. Whereas the Obama 
administration course corrected following the criticism of Secretary Clinton’s neo-colonialism 
allegation, the Trump administration has shown no intention of course correcting in the face of 
African criticisms of this narrative.  
While the Obama administration made vague references to China’s threat in Africa, 
often without explicitly referencing China by name, the Trump administration chose to replace 
their Africa policy with a China-bashing policy. In December 2018 John R. Bolton, President 
Trump’s National Security Advisor, announced the Trump administration’s new Africa policy, 
Prosper Africa. During the course of a roughly 20-minute speech, Advisor Bolton mentioned 
China 14 times by name (White House, 2018). Advisor Bolton remarked that “great power 
competitors, namely China […] are deliberately and aggressively targeting their investments 
in the region to gain a competitive advantage over the United States” (ibid.). Advisor Bolton 
further warned that the Chinese were “taking advantage of African states to increase their own 
power and influence” (ibid.). This frames Africa as a ‘blank space’, home only to Sino-US 
competition. The accusation that the Chinese are ‘taking advantage’ of Africa further reveals 
the lack of agency the Trump administration credits African states with, infantilising the entire 
continent.  
Lending into the debt trap narrative pervasive throughout the Trump-era discourse on 
Sino-African relations, Advisor Bolton accused the Chinese of “the strategic use of debt to hold 
Africa captive to Beijing’s demands and wishes” before, paradoxically,  announcing the Trump 
administrations intention to do just that (ibid.). While insisting that the US was not among the 
“powers that pursue dollars for dependency”, Advisor Bolton warned African nations that they 
would reduce “generous American aid [to] countries that repeatedly vote against the United 
States in international forums” (ibid.). These types of blatant contradictions, evident within a 
single speech, are largely unique to the Trump administration. They reveal a larger pattern of 
disrespect that the Trump administration has exhibited towards Africa as a whole.  
Another debunked narrative that the Trump administration continues to espouse in 
Africa is that Chinese investment does not bring job creation. As Ambassador Nagy phrased 
it, “anyone beyond the skill level of turning over a shovel comes from China instead of being 
hired locally” (US Mission to the AU, 2018). This is a point that Secretary Pompeo repeated at 
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every stop on his African tour in February 2020, warning repeatedly that authoritarian regimes 
“don’t hire local people, they don’t train, they don’t lead” (DOS, 2020c). However, the job 
creation brought by Chinese investment would be near impossible to miss in Africa. As of 2017 
an estimated 10,000 Chinese-owned firms operated across the African continent, employing 
millions of Africans (Jayaram, Sun & Kassiri, 2017). To assume that African leaders are 
unaware of Chinese job creation on the continent is to underestimate the intelligence of an 
entire continent.  
This level of disrespect evidenced by the Trump administration is perhaps best 
exemplified in one of President Trump’s most notorious comments: referring to African nations 
as “shithole countries”. The racism evidenced by this comment needs no explanation. However, 
this comment should not be viewed as out of character for President Trump. President Trump 
has long been plagued by accusations of racism, sexism, and ableism, thoroughly reviewed in 
An Oral History of Trump’s Bigotry (Graham et al., 2019). 
This association with ‘-isms’ is, however, one contributing factor to how President 
Trump came to be president. President Trump was elected because he rallied the discontent 
with globalization that the liberal order had brought (Stiglitz, 2017). Despite being shaped 
largely by the US, and much to the advantage of US interests (though unfortunately business 
interests rather than the interests of labour), economic liberalism has resulted in rampant 
inequality and a hollowing out of the middle class (Harvey, 2005). By the time President Trump 
began his campaign, this discontent with liberalism was boiling over into discontent with the 
status quo of Washington, DC. Thus, when President Trump began to portray the US as a weak, 
naïve actor, long taken advantage of by the international community, his message resonated 
with a certain demographic: white nationalists and populists. President Trump has curated a 
political base that shows little regard for people of colour, which has legitimized his disrespect 
of the African continent. 
Perhaps more telling than President Trump’s comment is how the administration sought 
to soothe the backlash it created. Secretary Tillerson was dispatched on a tour of Africa to 
demonstrate that the US “commitment to Africa is quite clear in terms of the importance we 
place on the relationship” (DOS, 2018b). In a joint press conference between Secretary 
Tillerson and African Union Chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat, when asked about President 
Trumps ‘shithole’ comment, Chairperson Moussa Faki remarked “I believe this incident is of 
the past […] the evidence of the relations between Africa and the United States is personified 
through [Secretary Tillerson’s] visit. I believe reasonably that this partnership has produced 
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results” (DOS, 2018b). These results were undoubtedly undermined when Secretary Tillerson 
had to cut his Africa trip short after he was abruptly fired during his trip.  
In a further demonstration of the ‘tone deaf’ nature of the Trump administration’s 
engagement with Africa, during Secretary Tillerson’s mission to repair the US-African 
relationship, the secretary made it clear that his true intention was to contest the Chinese 
influence on the continent. In another telling exchange between Secretary Tillerson and 
Chairperson Moussa Faki, Secretary Tillerson remarked “we think it’s important that Africans 
countries carefully consider the terms of [Chinese] investments, and we witness the model that 
the Chinese follow […] So our message is for countries to consider carefully what the terms of 
those agreements and, and not forfeit any elements of your sovereignty as you enter into such 
arrangements with China” (DOS, 2018b). Picking up on the patronising tone used by Secretary 
Tillerson, Chairperson Moussa Faki responded, “I think the Africans are mature enough to 
engage in partnerships of their own volition […] So there is no monopoly […] We know our 
interests, and it is our full awareness, I think, that is most important” (DOS, 2018b).  
Chairperson Moussa Faki’s ‘there is no monopoly’ comment lends into a larger 
narrative of the Trump administration’s framing of the Sino-African relationship, that Africa 
is the site of a zero-sum game between the US and China. The Trump administration seems to 
be edging increasingly towards a policy of either/or engagement reminiscent of Cold War era 
alignment policies. This reflects the larger turn of the Trump administration towards realism. 
While the Bush and Obama administrations attempted to institute their own forms of liberalism, 
the Trump administration is founded on an opposition to the liberal order, while neglecting to 
advance a clear alternative. While the Bush and Obama administrations gained a clear objective 
and purpose in Africa, provided by the liberal order, the Trump administration is lacking a clear 
purpose. Consequently, instead of advancing liberal norms such as democracy and human 
rights, the Trump policy towards Africa turned towards China bashing as a way of elevating 
themselves. Thus, the Trump administration is unique in that it does not attempt to project a 
self-image in Africa, rather it relies on projecting a negative image of China, a project which 
has largely been unsuccessful. Referring back to Advisor Bolton’s Prosper Africa 
announcement, throughout the 20-minute speech, US Africa policy standards such as the 
promotion of human rights and good governance are absent, in a clear break with previous 
administrations. 
While distancing themselves from the humanitarian ideals of Bush- and Obama-era 
engagement with Africa, the Trump administration has attempted to reframe the US-Africa 
relationship into one of pure capitalism. While addressing African leaders in 2017, President 
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Trump congratulated them on being the victims of Western exploitation. In an off the cuff 
remark, President Trump stated “I have so many friends going to your countries, trying to get 
rich. I congratulate you. They’re spending a lot of money” (White House, 2017). Despite 
pausing, apparently for applause, President Trump’s comment was met with silence. And this 
is the power of liberal capitalism: it allows for unbridled exploitation, for people in the global 
North to plunder the global South in an attempt to ‘get rich’. By incorporating Africa into the 
liberal order of free trade and private enterprise, the inequality inherent to capitalism is 
propagated on a global scale (Harvey, 2005), allowing American corporations to continue 
extracting wealth from Africa.  
While the expansion of capitalism in Africa is not a goal unique to the Trump 
administration, the lack of a humanitarian pretence certainly is. This can also be explained 
through the Trump administration’s shift from liberalism to realism. As described in his 2004 
book, The Art of the Deal, President Trump believes that if you are not winning, someone is 
taking advantage of you. Watts (2017), when describing the president’s ideology, stated that 
President Trump “peddles directives that ignore what [other business writers] perceived as their 
obligation to shape good people and a good society. Instead, Trump’s injunctions look inward 
to promote a relentless self-aggrandizement, and outward to manipulate a world of facile 
images”. President Trump reflects this philosophy frequently in his administration’s framing 
of Sino-African relations. The Trump administration’s frequent use of misinformation and 
debunked myths in regard to Sino-African relations shows this attempt to manipulate the 
simplistic image the Trump administration has of Africa, as well as a self-aggrandized role as 
Africa’s source of knowledge and truth. Rather than making the US a more attractive trading 
partner, the Trump administration turned to China bashing, believing that the Africans would 
readily abandon the Chinese. However, in portraying Africa as a zero-sum game of exploitation 
to be won by either the US or China, it is clear that the Trump administration is leaving no 
space for Africa to ‘win’.  
 This rhetoric of exploitation, however, did not begin during the Trump 
administration. In 2012 Secretary Clinton gave a speech in Washington D.C. explaining 
Obama’s US Strategy to Sub-Saharan Africa. Secretary Clinton remarked “economic growth 
in Africa [will] fuel growth and prosperity worldwide” because “Africa presents the highest 
return on foreign direct investment of any developing region in the world” (DOS, 2012a). Here 
Africa is presented as an opportunity for exploitation by Western business. Several days later, 
when rolling out the same strategy in Senegal, Secretary Clinton would take a jab at the Chinese 
when she remarked “Africa needs partnership, not patronage […] a model of sustainable 
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partnership that adds value rather than extracts it” (DOS, 2012b). This shift in tone is easy to 
explain. When addressing an American audience, Secretary Clinton is quick to point out the 
opportunities for American businesses to extract wealth from Africa. When addressing an 
African audience, she points out how the Chinese are extracting wealth, whereas the Americans 
are adding it. This form of double-speak reveals that the Obama administration, rather than 
engaging with Africa for the sole sake of liberal ideology, is keenly aware of the economic 
importance of Africa. Therefore, China’s presence is a threat, not only to the liberalising 
mission of the US, but also to the capital accumulation possible for the US in Africa. The 
underlying message for Africa is that it is better to be exploited by America, the moral power, 
than China, the ‘pernicious economic competitor with no morals’. It is an argument that relies 
on the ‘otherness’ of China, of a China that, as the Obama and Trump administrations have 
framed it, cannot be trusted. 
This is a framing that continued into the Trump administration. While warning Africa 
about the dangers of Chinese exploitation, the Trump administration was busy attempting to 
carve out more liberty for American companies to freely exploit Africa. As President Trump’s 
own Secretary of State Rex Tillerson proved, corruption is rampant within private sector 
engagement with Africa. A report published by Honest Accounts estimates that while US$ 161 
billion flows into Africa annually, US$ 202 billion flows out of Africa annually (Curtis & 
Jones, 2017). The bulk of this outflow is illicit financial flows (IFF), with trade misinvoicing 
alone accounting for US$ 40 billion in IFF from Africa, and multinational company profits 
accounting for a further US$ 32 billion (ibid.). Assistant Secretary Singh contrasted this to 
China’s approach when she remarked “our private sector is coming in to do business on 
commercial terms, and so we think that this is a better alternative for you to look at” (DOS, 
2019b). However, given that China’s approach to Africa is also largely though private sector 
engagement, it is unclear how this represents an ‘alternative’. What is clear is that through 
increased private sector engagement with Africa, the true ‘winner’ will be the private 
corporations, both Chinese and American, extracting the wealth of Africa. 
 
Co-opting the ‘China-Africa Model’ 
 
This marks another discontinuity between the Bush-era and the Obama- and Trump-eras, that 
as these administrations shifted towards Sino-pessimism, they also began to adopt Chinese 
practices in how they engaged with Africa. Beginning in the Obama administration, US 
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discourse towards Africa began to co-opt the same language the Chinese use in their 
engagement with Africa. China has long framed their engagement with Africa using terms such 
as ‘win-win’, ‘mutually beneficial’, and ‘brotherhood’. Thus, when President Obama frames 
himself as a ‘son of Africa’, he is invoking the same familial bonds frequently utilised by the 
Chinese. The Obama administration made use of discourse espousing “mutual interest and 
respect” in US-Africa relations (White House, 2009; DOS, 2012b), phrases often used by the 
Chinese. Advisor Bolton described that the US was “shaping relations with Africa to the mutual 
advantage” of both Africa and the US, and how this was “a very different view than […] some 
of our competitors hold” (Bolton, 2018), paradoxically co-opting Chinese rhetoric to espouse 
American exceptionalism.  
As shown above, this was not merely a discursive shift. While the US discourse towards 
Africa began to echo that of China in the Obama and Trump administrations, their practices 
also began mirroring their own criticisms of the Chinese in Africa, as illustrated by the Trump 
administration’s aim to begin engaging in ‘dollars for diplomacy’. While warning Africa of 
Chinese exploitation, the Obama and Trump administrations began implementing policy shifts 
that would enable American private interests to more freely exploit Africa. While warning 
Africa that the Chinese would ‘undercut their sovereignty’, these administrations continued to 
use conditionalities, limiting African policy space and self-determination. While Africa has 
freely chosen to engage with China, these administrations have continued to undermine their 
agency by offering paternalistic advice against engagement with China.  
What separates the Obama administration from the Trump administration, despite all 
of these similarities, is the latter’s simmering sense of resentment that Africa would continue 
to engage with China despite the US expressing criticism of these relations. Assistant Secretary 
Nagy blamed this choice on the lack of American presence when he remarked “when someone 
knocked on the door to come and do business in Africa, and the African governments opened 
the door and the Chinese were the only ones standing there, I cannot blame the African 
governments for doing business deals with China” (AU, 2018). What Assistant Secretary Nagy 
does blame the Africans for, however, is not creating “the correct environment to attract 
investment of the types of investors that deal honestly, openly, transparently” (AU, 2018).  This 
framing reveals that the Trump administration believes that both China and Africa have acted 
illegitimately through engaging with one another.  
Despite this line of rhetoric, the Trump administration has done little to remedy their 
lack of presence in Africa. Throughout the first year of the Trump presidency, nearly half of 
the ambassadorships in Africa remained unfilled, and nearly a third went unfilled in 2018. In 
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fact, President Trump declined to fill the position of Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau 
of African Affairs until May 2018. This is a fact at odds with an administration that has 
committed itself to a growing business presence in Africa. Ambassadors generally serve as a 
first port of call for large investments or trade deals in foreign countries. By leaving these posts 
unfilled, the Trump administration made clear the lack of importance they place on their 
relationship with Africa. By abandoning the ideology of ‘making Africa better’ that the Bush 
and Obama administrations utilised, the Trump administration has fundamentally altered the 
exceptionalism, the perceived morality of their engagement, that US international engagement 
has long relied on, making it just another economic competitor among many. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
While the field of Sino-African relations has been widely studied, the discursive framing of 
Sino-African relations utilized by the US has been oft ignored. This paper, rather than proving 
that the US discourse on Sino-African relations is flawed, sought to show why this flawed 
discourse is still being utilized. With this in mind, this paper analysed how the framing of Sino-
African relations reflected the representation of itself the US was attempting to project at the 
time. 
 The Bush-era was brimming with a near religious zeal regarding the liberal system. The 
attacks on 9/11 proved to the Bush administration that the world needed liberalism now, more 
than ever. The Bush-era sought to project an image of the US as a benevolent power, seeking 
to bring the stabilising power of liberalism to the entire world. Thus, when China began to 
engage with Africa, the Bush administration believed it had found a project for both the US 
and China to tackle jointly. Though the Chinese failed to attempt to institute liberal reforms in 
Africa, these were dismissed as the growing pains of a soon-to-be liberal China.  
 Conversely, the liberal order inherited by President Obama was one facing a crisis of 
legitimacy. The Bush legacy required a more cosmopolitan touch to correct. Distracted by a 
mission to repair the standing of the US in international eyes, and thus the liberal global order, 
the Obama administration decided that China’s engagement in Africa, with its disregard for 
liberal ideology, was untenable.  Once again, the US was charged with ‘saving Africa’, this 
time from the illiberal Chinese influence on the continent.  
 The Trump administration voiced an intent to tear down the liberal order, without 
advancing a clear alternative. Thus, the liberalizing mission that the Bush and Obama 
administrations drew purpose from was lost to the Trump administration. The US-Africa 
relationship as envisioned by the Trump administration was one where the US had sole access 
to the economic exploitation of Africa. Through the use of racist discourse, and erratic policy 
decisions, the Trump administration projected a self-image of an unstable US with little to no 
regard for the continent of Africa.  
What has become clear during the course of this research is that, despite the increasing 
criticism of China in Africa, the US interest in Africa has waned. While the Bush administration 
worked to make Africa a priority in US policy, the same cannot be said about the Obama 
administration. To mask the lack of priority given to Africa under the Obama administration, 
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the administration began to espouse Sino-pessimism and grand, empty rhetoric of 
transformation and familial bonds. More troublingly, the Trump administration has showed a 
general disregard for people of colour, not only internationally but also at home. This has 
legitimized his disinterest in Africa, paired with a general simmering resentment and 
disrespectful tone that has made his disdain for the continent clear.  
The US has long treated Africa as the ‘other’ to illustrate its own exceptionalism. As 
described by Mbembe “Africa as an idea, a concept, has historically served, and continues to 
serve, as a polemical argument for the West’s desperate desire to assert its difference from the 
rest of the world” (2001: 2). When the US talks about Africa, it is discussing an imagined 
Africa, a ‘dark continent’ which serves as the shadow to the gleaming American ‘city upon the 
hill’.  
 When Ghanaian President Nana Akufo-Addo declared that “America’s responsibility 
in the 21st century is to remain the shining city upon the hill, the force of whose ideas inspire 
greater chapters in man’s development” (C-SPAN, 2018),  it came a mere month after President 
Trump called African nations ‘shithole countries’. This image of the gleaming city on a hill 
reinforces the image of the US as exceptional, as an example to strive after, but fundamentally 
out of reach. However, this city upon the hill has been tarnished by the Trump administration. 
In moving away from the often problematic, but no less lofty, idealism that the Bush and 
Obama administration’s espoused, the Trump administration has lost much of what was framed 
as exceptional about the US. Despite missteps and ignorant discourse from previous 
administrations, the Trump administration stands alone in espousing clear disdain for Africa.  
 With the current unrest in the United States surrounding the Black Lives Matter 
movement, is it not time that the world moves away from the idea of ‘a gleaming city upon a 
hill’, particularly one as tarnished as the US? This moment in history should mark a shift 
towards analysing the discursive power structures of the world, interrogating assumed truths to 
reveal an alternative reading of what is thought to be self-evident. For, despite its inaccuracy, 
the negative perception of China in Africa persists, and is made more readily acceptable due to 
how both China and Africa have been framed in the US consciousness.  
In researching this thesis, a wider gap in the literature was made apparent. While the 
discursive power of the US is widely acknowledged, US political discourse regarding Africa 
remains a severely understudied field. This perhaps reflects the larger narrative that, within 
international relations, Africa is generally recognised as ‘the forgotten continent’. An 
interesting, though much larger project, could be to study the historic representations of Africa 
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by US administrations, and how this has made the current US framing of Sino-African relations 
possible. 
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